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Abstract
The use of telematics in the automobile industry has been growing recently to re-
solve the problem of asymmetric information in the insurance market related to the
identification of the type of a driver. This paper aims to study the impact of the
introduction of usage-based insurance on the market participants taking into account
the privacy costs associated with the installation of such a behaviour-monitoring
device. We assume that UBI is offered as part of the contract to the agents and is
voluntary to install. Our findings suggest that no matter how highly an agent values
her privacy, there will always be some proportion of the low-type agents who register
for UBI to receive full coverage at a higher premium. Moreover, the high-types are
weakly worse-off with the introduction of UBI as they pay a higher premium for full
coverage. The results of our analysis imply that UBI is Pareto-improving if it allows
the company to serve a new market, in which the low-types were not being served
initially, else it might be welfare decreasing.
Keywords: Usage-based insurance, privacy costs, asymmetric information, welfare
JEL Classification: D62, D82, D86, G22
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1 Introduction
It is well known that the presence of asymmetric information about the type of agents
in the insurance market distorts the contracts being offered to the agents. There are
good drivers (low-types) who remain within speed limits, follow traffic regulations,
etc. Bad drivers (high-types) drive unsafely and fail to adhere to traffic rules and
regulations. It is not possible for an insurance company to determine whether a driver
is a high or low-type when they offer the contract initially. The insurance company
can at best determine the type of the agent by looking at her previous claims, age,
city of residence, mileage, etc. However, claims might be underreported and mileage
declared incorrectly. This means that the company cannot form an accurate judgement
regarding the type of the driver, a problem that is referred as the ‘hidden-type’ model
in the literature of information economics. Information asymmetry induces a high-type
driver to try to pass as a low-type driver. According to the classic theory in information
economics (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976), the low-types subsidise the high-types, who
are offered full-coverage. The information asymmetry forces the insurance company to
expose the low-types to some risk, by offering a policy which is cheaper but provides
partial coverage. Hence, the insurance company needs to provide incentives such that
the drivers self-select and opt for the policy designed for them according to their type.
Usage-based insurance (UBI) provides a solution to reduce the information asymmetry
in the market. UBI is offered as an additional device to the agents, and they have an
option to install it or not. If the agent agrees to sign up for UBI, a small telematic
device is plugged in their car, which transmits information about their driving be-
haviour to the insurance company. Information on miles driven, braking, speed, etc. is
collected and transmitted to the company. The insurance company then analyses this
information and assigns a driving score to the driver. The premiums are calculated
1
according to the driving behaviour of the individual as compared to the traditional
premium calculations, which were based on the information reported by the driver.
The concept of usage-based insurance is not entirely new. The black-boxes for cars were
introduced in 2003, and due to the high cost of the technology at that time, information
was collected in real-time but recovered only in case of an accident. Given the high
cost it was mainly targeted to young-drivers who were presumed to be the high-types.1
With technology advancements, the cost of producing behaviour-monitoring devices
has decreased and UBI devices now transmit information in real-time. It is now a
common trend for companies to offer different types of usage-based insurance, for exam-
ple, pay-as-you-drive (PAYD), pay-as-you-speed (PAYS), pay-how-you-drive (PHYD),
etc. Pay-as-you-drive is based on the miles driven by the agent. Pay-as-you-speed
rewards drivers for maintaining speed limits while driving. Pay-how-you-drive provides
incentives for drivers to drive more carefully and avoid sudden acceleration, excessive
braking, sharp turning, etc. The market for UBI has grown by 26 % worldwide in
2017, the major growth being accounted for in the United States.2 If a low-type driver
registers for UBI, it can lead to a reduction in premium by about 25 %.3 Even though
that is a substantial reduction in premium for low-type drivers, it comes with a privacy
cost. Once the driver installs the device in their car, the insurance company gains
access to all whereabouts of the driver. The privacy costs arise from the disutility
agents get from being monitored. Thus, some good drivers might not be interested
in installing the device to protect their privacy even though it might lead them to
receive a contract which is worse than previously offered.
1https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/ca/news/auto/ubi-company-targeting-under-24-
market-in-ontario-46792.aspx
2https://www.ptolemus.com/ubi-study/quarterly-ubi-dashboard/ubi-dashboard-update-jan-18/
3http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/sudbury/insurance-companies-use-black-box-technology-to-
track-driving-habits-1.3187410
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The concept of UBI is not limited to the automobile market but extends to health
insurance and other sectors. It is increasingly common for health insurance companies
to offer smart-watches as trackers to determine the well-being and activity levels of the
client. The premium is charged accordingly to the insured. Another example would
be companies performing a credit-check for their potential new-hires, to determine
whether they are good or bad risks to the company. Supposing that personal finance
is a proxy for the type of the agent (good or bad employee), a credit check can reduce
asymmetry between companies and their potential new hires.
Our aim is to study the effects of UBI on the contracts offered by an insurance
company with market power, as well as on the profit and welfare levels, while taking
privacy costs into account. Insurance companies market usage-based insurance as a
scheme to reward low-type drivers, but we show that it is mostly a tool to extract a
higher premium from the high-types once they are identified by the company after
the introduction of UBI. It could be argued that UBI might lead a driver to change
her behavior and become a safe driver but we focus on the hidden-type problem in
our study.4 UBI and black-boxes have been the subject of a few previous studies.
A study by Arvidsson (2011) shows that the low-types and the high-types get full
coverage at their actuarially fair rates after low-types register for UBI. However, to
obtain analytical results it assumes that the insurance company provides full insurance
to both types of drivers. By opposition we fully consider the incentive compatibil-
ity constraints which lead to low-types receiving partial coverage, and additionally
differentiate agents according to their privacy costs. Several studies (Hultkrantz et
al. (2012), Stigson et al. (2014), Agerholm et al. (2008), Litman (2005)) examine the
impact of introducing UBI as a tool to change the driving behaviour of the agent,
thereby reducing the moral hazard problem. Another study by Fan et al. (2016) aims
4http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/usage-based-insurance-ubi-car-insurance-
big-brother-1.4193862
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at measuring privacy costs and the gap between the willingness to share data and
the importance of that data in UBI. Closest to our analysis is the model proposed by
Filipova-Neumann and Welzel (2010) which studies the impact of offering black-boxes
as an additional contract for drivers. The insurance company offers the agents to
install black-boxes which would record their driving behaviour. As opposed to UBI,
the company would gain access to the information only when an accident occurs. Thus,
in opposition to how we model UBI, all users who register for a black-box initially
pay the same premium, and the type is discovered only if an accident occurs. It is
only then the company observes the type of the driver. If the driver is low-type, the
company offers them a full coverage, else they only receive partial coverage. Contrary
to what happens with UBI (and in our model), high-type agents are able to masquer-
ade as low-types as long as an accident does not occur. They study the impacts for
both competitive and monopoly markets, and generally find that the black-boxes are
welfare improving, even with privacy costs, modelled as a fraction of agents having
the same disutility for sharing their information. As we do for UBI, they find that
black-boxes are Pareto-improving if it allows to offer coverage to clients unserved before.
The other major difference in our analysis is how we model privacy costs, with
these being uniformly distributed in an interval. That allows for more subtle and
realistic results in which the company optimally chooses the proportion of agents who
register for UBI, and in which we never have that nobody registers and only obtain
that all low-types register if privacy costs are extremely low. We find that the device
might lead to a loss in overall welfare. The low-types who register get full insurance
at higher premiums and the device has no effect on the welfare of low-types who do
not register due to privacy concerns. The high-types receive the same full coverage
but at a higher premium. An exception is when the low-types were not being served
by the company earlier.
4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the general set-
ting of the model. Section 3 provides the results once UBI is introduced, Section
4 analyses welfare effects on market participants and discusses policy implications.
Section 5 concludes and lists some extensions.
2 The Model
There are two types of risk-averse drivers in the market, high-types (h) and low-types
(l), with identical von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, a single insurance
company in a monopoly position. Low-type agents drive more carefully, keep within
speed limits and pay more attention to traffic rules. On the other hand, high-type
drivers may engage in speeding, not following traffic rules, etc. Both have the same
initial wealth, W, but have different probabilities of incurring an accident. If they
incur an accident, they suffer a loss, L,5 where 0 < L < W . The utility function we
assume for the agents to study the impact of usage-based insurance is
√
y, where y
is income. This implies that both agents are risk-averse and hence would consider
buying an insurance to compensate for their loss. The probability of accident for a
low-type driver is α, while for a high-type it is δ. The high-type drivers are more prone
to having an accident, hence 0 < α < δ. If the agent buys insurance the compensation
and premium depend on the contract signed with the insurance company. There are
two possible scenarios. One in which there is no accident, and in that case, the agent
pays the premium but does not receive any benefit. In case there is an accident, the
agent receives a payment from the insurance company as compensation.
5L is not limited to the value of the car, and can include medical expenses and liabilities for the
damage caused.
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Due to information asymmetry, the insurance company cannot distinguish the type of
driver, but can form an expectation regarding the proportion of each type. The total
number of potential clients is normalised to 1, and a proportion µ of the population is
high-type, with 0 < µ < 1. The policy (xl, pl) is offered to low-types and (xh, ph) is
offered to high-types, where xi is the coverage offered and pi is the premium the agent
of type i pays. Since installing the device in a driver’s car will allow the company to
monitor them, there is a privacy cost, ai, associated with the installation of the device,
which varies agent to agent. It is assumed that there is no correlation between the
type of the agent and her privacy costs. The privacy costs are uniformly distributed
in the interval [0, A] where A represents the maximum amount at which an agent
values her privacy and summarizes the importance of privacy cost in the market. To
provide incentives to low-type drivers, the insurance company offers a rebate, R, if
they choose to install the device.
We can write the utility for the low-type agent without insurance as:
UNIl = α
√
W − L+ (1− α)
√
W.
and for the high-type agents as:
UNIh = δ
√
W − L+ (1− δ)
√
W.
We define, pFBi , as the premium agent i pays if offered a first-best contract which
provides full coverage to the agent. Mathematically, we can find:
pFBi s.t.
√
W − pFBi = UNIi .
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If the low-type agent buys the insurance without signing up for UBI then her utility
is:
α
√
W − L+ xl − pl + (1− α)
√
W − pl.
However, if the low-type agent buys insurance with UBI, her utility then becomes:
α
√
W − L+ xl − pl +R− ai + (1− α)
√
W − pl +R− ai.
Similarly we can write the utility for high-type agents.
We can represent our problem in a game-tree with two stages.
Figure 1: Game representation for UBI
In the first-stage low-types decide to register for UBI or not depending on their privacy
costs, ai, and the company offers contracts with UBI, which the agents either accept
or refuse. After observing who has registered, the company offers contracts to the
remaining agents without UBI.
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3 Results
The results from our analyses of the impact of the introduction of UBI are presented
below. We first examine the optimal contracts offered to the agents who do not register
for UBI and to those agents that did register. We then examine how the agents decide
to register or not, before examining how the rebate for using UBI is chosen.
3.1 Contracts for agents who do not register
Once a proportion β of low-types have registered, the insurance company knows that
a proportion θ are high-types among the remaining population of drivers, which now
consists of the high-type drivers and the low-type drivers who do not register. In order
for both types to buy insurance, the participation constraint for low-types should be
binding, and to avoid high-types to benefit by mimicking low-type agents, the incentive
compatibility constraint for high-types should be binding. The insurance company as
a monopolist wants to maximise its profits. In order for both types to buy insurance,
the participation constraint for low-types should be binding, and to avoid high-types
to benefit by mimicking low-type agents, the incentive compatibility constraint for
high-types should be binding. From classic theory on information economics we know
that the high-type are always fully insured, xSBh = L (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976).
The insurance company offers low-types a contract (xSBl , p
SB
l ) and the high-types a
contract (xSBh , p
SB
h ) such that the participation constraint of the low-types and the
incentive compatibility constraint of the high-types are binding.
Mathematically, the participation constraint of the low-type is:
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α
√
W − pSBl + xSBl − L+ (1− α)
√
W − pSBl > UNIl .
where the RHS represents the utility for the low-type agent without an insurance
contract, and the LHS represents the utility of the agent if she buys insurance. Since
this constraint is binding, we can solve for xSBl (p
SB
l ). The incentive compatibility
constraint of the high-type agent is:
δ
√
W − pSBh + xSBh − L+(1−δ)
√
W − pSBh > δ
√
W − pSBl + xSBl − L+(1−δ)
√
W − pSBl .
The incentive compatibility constraint implies that the high-types derive a higher
utility from the contract designed for them (LHS) than that from the contract designed
for the low-types (RHS). The fulfillment of this condition would lead to the high-types
self-selecting the contract designed for them. Using the fact that xSBh = L, we can
write √
W − pSBh > δ
√
W − pSBl + xSBl (pSBl )− L+ (1− δ)
√
W − pSBl .
Since it is also binding we can solve for pSBh (p
SB
l ).
The profit function can then be written and maximised as a function of pSBl :
max
pSBl
Π = θ(pSBh (p
SB
l )− δL) + (1− θ)(pSBl − αxl(pSBl )).
Since this problem cannot be solved analytically, we provide a numerical solution.
We define initial parameters as: W = 200000, L = 100000, α = 0.05, δ = 0.08,
µ = 0.20 and A = 1000. The contracts offered without UBI are then xSBl = 43283.56,
pSBl = 2751.36, x
SB
h = 100000, and p
SB
h = 7641.63. The profit for the company without
UBI is 398.07.
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Figure 2: Premium for high and low-types
Figure 2 depicts the premiums charged in the second-stage to the high-types and
the low-types who do not register, as a function of θ, the proportion of high-types.
The premium for the low-types falls as the proportion of high-types rises in the
market, as it becomes more profitable to serve the high-types. The insurance company
charges higher premiums to the high-types. The contract offered to the low-types who
did not register worsens as the company decreases their coverage and the premium
charged (Figure 3). While in the graph xSBl , p
SB
l < 0 for θ > 0.32, the company
cannot offer negative coverage and premiums, it instead stops serving the low-types
(pSBl = x
SB
l = 0). Since serving the low-types limits how much we can extract from
high-types, as the proportion of high-types increases in the market, we reach a point
where the low-types are abandoned. We call θ¯ such proportion of high-types. When
we reach such a point where the low-types are unserved, we say that the market for
low-types has collapsed.
10
Figure 3: Coverage for high and low-types
3.2 Contracts for agents who register
As seen in the previous subsection, high-types enjoy an information rent, and the
company would have to leave them with as much utility to convince them to install
UBI. Additionally, the insurance company would also have to compensate them for
their privacy cost, and offering this would be more costly to the firm than a contract
without UBI. Hence, the policy offered to the high-type agents in case they register for
UBI is (xFBh , p
FB
h ), where p
FB
h is the premium charged to the high-types in a first-best
contract. This condition would prohibit the high-types to sign up for UBI. As for the
low-types the insurance company then knows their type and offers them full coverage
(xFBl , p
FB
l − R), with a rebate compared to the first-best contract to cover privacy
costs. Given that the low-types receive partial coverage without UBI, there is an
opportunity to increase profits for the company by offering UBI.
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3.3 Decision to accept or not
The agents observe their privacy costs and decide whether to register for UBI or not.
The rebate for installing the device is paid after the company observes their type. If
the low-types decide to register, the utility they receive is:
√
W − pFBl − ai +R
while it is UNIl if she does not register. Since U
NI
l =
√
W − pFBi , the low-type who
have ai 6 R will sign up for UBI and those who value their privacy more will not.
Graphically, we have the following in which the low-types will decide whether to
register for UBI or not taking their privacy costs in consideration.
Figure 4: Low-types decide whether to register
If the high-types register for the device they would reveal their type to the insurance
company and it will not provide them any rebates. Hence, the high-type agents will
have to pay for their privacy costs. The utility for high-types from registering from
UBI can be expressed as:
√
W − pFBh − ai 6 UNIh ≤
√
W − pSBh .
Since, the high-types get a higher utility from the second-best contracts, they will not
register for the device.
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3.4 Choice of Rebate
The insurance company can control the number of low-types who will register for UBI,
by setting the rebates it will offer. As seen in the previous subsection, the low-types
who value their privacy less than the rebate offered by the company will register and
the ones who value their privacy more will not. For a rebate R > 0, agents with ai in
[0, R] register, and then by the uniform distribution assumption, β =
R
A
. Knowing
this, the insurance company can select the proportion β of low-types who register by
choosing R = βA.
Then, the insurance company knows the proportion of low-types who registered,
and can evaluate the proportion of high-types in the remaining population of drivers
by:
θ = µ
µ+(1−β)(1−µ) . By backward induction and defining pi
FB
l and pi
SB
l as the first-best
and second-best profits respectively when selling to the low-types, the profit function
for the company can now be written entirely as a function of β:
max
β
Π = µ(ph(θ)− δL) + (1− β)(1− µ)(pl(θ)− αxl(θ)) + β(1− µ)[piFBl − βA].
We define β∗, as the proportion of registrations required to maximise the profit for
the company.
13
Figure 5: Optimal value of β
Again we solve numerically for our example, and from Figure 5, we can see that
the optimal number of registrations which maximize profit for the company is 0.163.
The contracts offered at the optimal value of β are xl = 33298.24, pl = 2155.37,
xh = 100000, ph = 7994.36, R = 163, p
FB
l = 5814.36 and x
FB
l = 100000. The profits
after the introduction of UBI are $412.27.
We define β¯ be the proportion of low-type registering that make the market col-
lapse.6 Even without having to solve analytically for β∗, we can proceed with the
following results. If privacy costs, A, are very low, then all the low-type agents register
for UBI (β∗ = 1). If A is low, the firm would make the market for the low-types
collapse to maximise its profits (β∗ > β¯). And if A is high, the company will continue
to offer the second-best contracts for the low-types who do not register (0 < β∗ < β¯).
However, even if A is very high we have that some low-type agents always register for
the device (β∗ > 0).
6i.e.
µ
µ + (1− β¯)(1− µ) = θ¯ if µ 6 θ¯ and β¯ = 0 if µ > θ¯
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Theorem 1 i) If A > pi
FB
l
2β¯
, then 0 < β∗ 6 β¯
ii) If A 6 pi
FB
l
2
, then β∗ = 1
iii) If
piFBL
2
6 A 6 pi
FB
L
2β¯
then β¯ 6 β∗ 6 1, with β∗ = pi
FB
L
2A
.
Proof. We first show that β∗ > 0. The second-period profits are:
Π = µ(ph − δL) + (1− β)(1− µ)(pl − αxl) + β(1− µ)[piFBl − βA]. (1)
Taking first-order conditions with respect to β, we get:
∂Π
∂β
= µ
∂ph
∂pl
.
∂pl
∂β
+ (1− µ)(1− β)
[
∂pl
∂β
− α∂xl
∂pl
.
∂pl
∂β
]
−
(1− µ)[pl(β)− αxl] + (1− µ)[piFBl − βA]− β(1− µ)A = 0.
We evaluate the first-order condition at β = 0:
µ
∂ph
∂pl
∂pl
∂β
∣∣∣
β=0
+(1−µ)
[
∂pl
∂β
∣∣∣
β=0
−α∂xl
∂pl
∂pl
∂β
∣∣∣
β=0
]
+(1−µ)
[
piFBl − [pl(0)−αxl(pl(0))]
]
.
(2)
This is equivalent to:
∂pl
∂β
∣∣∣
β=0
[
µ
∂ph
∂pl
∣∣∣
β=0
+ (1− µ)
(
1− α∂xl
∂pl
∣∣∣
β=0
)]
+ (1− µ)
[
piFBl − piSBl
]
. (3)
We have two cases :
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1. The market has not collapsed, under which
∂pl
∂β
6= 0. (4)
Let ΠSB = µ[ph(pl)− δL] + (1− µ)(pl − αxl). be the second-best profit when UBI is
not an option.
Taking F.O.C. w.r.t. pl:
∂ΠSB
∂pl
= µ
∂ph(pl)
∂pl
+ (1− µ)− α(1− µ)∂xl
∂pl
= 0. (5)
= µ
∂ph
∂pl
+ (1− µ)
[
1− α∂xl
∂pl
]
= 0. (6)
Then using (6), we can simplify (3) into
∂Π
∂β
= (1− µ)(piFBl − piSBl ) > 0.
2. The market has collapsed, under which
∂pl
∂β
= 0. (7)
and (3) simplifies to ∂Π
∂β
> 0.
Combining both cases, we conclude that β∗ > 0 .
We then distinguish three cases, depending if β∗ 6 β¯ , β¯ 6 β∗ 6 1, or β∗ = 1. If β∗ > β¯,
the first two parts of equation (1) are fixed w.r.t. β. So ∂Π
∂β
= piFBl (1−µ)−2βA(1−µ).
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At β¯, that derivative is negative if A ≥ piFBl
2β¯
and stays negative as β increases. So if
A > pi
FB
l
2β¯
, then β∗ 6 β¯.
At β = 1, that derivative is positive if A 6 pi
FB
l
2
, and stays positive for all smaller
values of β.
In between, the derivative is initially positive, then negative, so we find the optimal
value at β∗ = pi
FB
l
2A
. So, if
piFBL
2
6 A 6 pi
FB
L
2β¯
then β¯ 6 β∗ 6 1, with β∗ = pi
FB
L
2A
.
4 Analysis and Implications
This section presents the results of the sensitivity of optimal registrations and profits
to the change in parameters and analyses the welfare effects from the introduction of
UBI.
4.1 Sensitivity Analysis
We verify the sensitivity of optimal registrations, β∗, and profits, Π, to changes in
parameters used in our model. An increase in the initial number of high-types, µ,
leads to a fall in β∗ as the insurance company is already extracting more money from
the high-type, and there is less incentive for the company to offer UBI and differentiate
the low and high-types. The profit for the company rises as high-types are more
profitable. An increase in loss incurred (L) or decrease in initial wealth (W), makes
the average profit made on asymmetric information market proportionally higher than
the profit made from the first-best contracts offered by installing UBI. Therefore, the
company diverts its attention from UBI to the traditional market, leading to a fall in
β∗ and a rise in profits.
If the probability of accident for high-type, δ, rises, it would be more effective to
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separate high and low-types by offering the device, leading to a higher β∗ and a
lower level of profits because it becomes tougher to satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint, as the high-types can benefit by mimicking low-types, at a heavy cost
for the insurance company. The opposite holds true if the probability of loss for a
low-type, α, falls. An increase in privacy costs, A, would make it more expensive
for the insurance company to offer UBI, as it needs to offer higher rebates to induce
low-types to register for the device. This has a negative impact on profits. The results
from the analysis are summarised in Table 1.
Parameters β∗ pi
µ - +
W + -
L - +
δ + -
α - +
A - -
Table 1: Results for sensitivity analysis
4.2 Welfare Analysis
The introduction of UBI has effects on welfare, creating both winners and losers. The
high-type drivers are weakly worse-off as they are charged a premium at least as large
for the same full coverage, after a UBI contract is offered to low-types. In monetary
terms, the effect of UBI on high-types is pSBh (β
∗) − ph(0) 6 0 i.e. before UBI was
introduced, they paid pSBh (0), while after UBI they pay p
SB
h (β
∗). But, the higher
premium charged to them gets transferred to the insurance company, and hence this is
a zero-sum game. The low-types who do not register for UBI are not affected by UBI,
as they receive a lower coverage at a lower premium, but their participation constraint
still is binding. The utility they receive before and after the contract remains the
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same. The low-types who register for the device now receive full coverage, but pay a
higher premium. In absence of a rebate, the participation constraint for low-types
would be binding. Hence, the benefit from registering for them comes from the rebate
being offered. More precisely, in monetary terms, the effect of UBI on low-types who
register is R− ai. Given the uniform distribution of privacy costs and the fact that
agents in [0, R] register, the gain to the average UBI subscriber is then
R
2
. Since,
R = β∗A, we can express the gain as β∗
A
2
. The insurance company is better-off as
it can offer first-best contracts to low-types who register at a higher premium and
extract a higher premium from high-type agents as well. In the original problem, the
profit function for the company was:
ΠSB = [µ[pSBh (0)− δL] + (1− µ)piSBl (0).
After UBI, the profit function becomes:
µ[pSBh (β
∗)− δL] + (1− µ)β∗[piFBl −R] + (1− µ)(1− β∗)piSBl (β∗).
The change in profit function can be expressed as:
∆Π = µ[pSBh (β
∗)−pSBh (0)]+(1−µ)β∗[piFBl −R−piSBl (0)]+(1−µ)(1−β∗)[piSBl (β∗)−piSBl (0)].
With UBI, the high-types pay a (weakly) higher premium for the same coverage which
increases profits. Among the low-types, less profit is made from those who do not
register but more profits are made on those who register. Overall, the change in profit
after UBI is positive for the company, as it could always recover its initial profit by
choosing β = 0. Combining with the change for consumers, the change in welfare is:
∆W = (1− µ)(1− β∗)[piSBl (β∗)− piSBl (0)] + (1− µ)β∗[piFBl − piSBl (0)−
β∗A
2
].
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The first-term is non-positive as low-type agents who do not register see their premium
and coverage (weakly) decrease leading to lower profits for the company. The sign
of the second term is unknown. Hence, the effect on welfare is in general undetermined.
For the example we have examined in this paper, the effect of welfare on UBI is
negative. To illustrate this scenario, we analyse Table 2. As we can see from the table
at β∗ = 0.163, the company earns an additional profit of $14.20. However, the overall
welfare effect is −45.77 following the introduction of UBI.
Market Participants Effect on consumer surplus Effect on profit
High-types -70.55 +70.55
Low-types who register +10.63 +8.37
Low-types who do not register No effect -64.77
Table 2: Effect of UBI on market participants when market hasn’t collapsed
When we start with a market when the company is serving both high and low-types,
the introduction of UBI might not improve welfare as we saw from the results presented
in the above table. The company is able to extract more profits by charging higher
premiums to high-types and the low-types who register. But it also has to pay a rebate
to the low-type who register. Since the company faces a trade-off between making
more profits from contracts to high-types and low-types (who do not register), because
the introduction of UBI increases the proportion of high-types among unregistered
clients, it moves to increase its profits on high-types. The company charges more
for full coverage to high-types and offers less coverage to low-types. Since, high-type
contracts are a zero-sum game, the losses of profits on low-types who do not register
are not compensated by the welfare and profit gain from the introduction of UBI.
To observe a case where the effect on welfare is positive, we take the initial value
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of proportion of high-types, µ, to be 0.40. Since, 0.40 > θ¯, this implies that the
insurance company is not serving the low-types initially, as it is profitable to serve
only the high-types. However, if the company introduces UBI, it will begin to serve
the low-types who register. The optimal number of registrations in this case is 0.41.
The gains for market participants are as presented in Table 3.
Market Participants Effect on consumer surplus Effect on profit
High-types No effect No effect
Low-types who register +50.43 +149.90
Low-types who do not register No effect No effect
Table 3: Effect of UBI on market participants when market has already collapsed
The high-types are unaffected from the introduction of UBI, as the premium charged
to them is unchanged. Their participation constraint is still binding and hence that is
the maximum premium the company can extract from them. The company benefits
from the introduction of UBI as it now serves low-types who register for the device
and makes profits on them. As for the low-types who register, they receive first-best
insurance as opposed to no insurance coverage before the introduction of UBI. As
their participation constraint is binding in both cases, the gains for them are realised
from R− ai. The low-types who do not register are unaffected, as they do not receive
a contract either before or after UBI is introduced. In our example, as shown in Table
3, we obtain a welfare gain as the low-type and the company gain without making the
low-type who do not register and the high-types worse-off. UBI is in that case not
only welfare-improving but also Pareto improving. This is a general result and we
have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 If µ > θ¯, the introduction of UBI is always Pareto improving.
The introduction of UBI in a case where the low-types were not being served initially
(µ > θ¯), as it was more profitable to extract higher premium from the high-types and
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not serve the low-types at all, is always Pareto-improving. This is because it allows
the company to offer first-best contracts to the low-types who sign up for UBI, which
increases its profits. This result is similar to the use of 3rd degree price-discrimination
to serve new clients.
4.3 Policy Implications
As we saw from our analyses, the introduction of UBI is not always welfare-improving.
It could then be a debate whether to ban UBI if it decreases welfare in some cases. A
tightening in regulations regarding privacy would lead to a fall in the range of privacy
costs, would lead to a higher number of registrations for the device, and consequently
higher profits for the company as it now has to provide less rebates to the agents.
As seen in the automobile insurance market, the high-types are penalised when
we introduce UBI. Many health insurance companies are using devices like Apple
watches to monitor the well-being of people. While in the case of automobile insurance
it seems acceptable for the high-types to pay more, as they were being subsidised
by low-types before the introduction of UBI, in health insurance this might be more
problematic. While it could be justified to charge high-types a higher premium if their
condition is due to their lifestyle, it would be unjust if it is due to genetics. Thus, we
should be careful to consider the characteristics of each market before concluding on
the welfare effects of UBI-like devices in markets other than automobile insurance.
5 Conclusions and Extensions
Here we summarise findings from our analyses and explain future fields of research
pertaining to this study.
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5.1 Conclusions
Recent growth in the number of insurance companies offering usage-based insurance led
us to study the impact of UBI on market participants. We analysed how introducing
UBI would alter the contracts being offered to the low-type and high-type drivers.
Keeping in mind that agents have privacy costs associated with installing a device that
would lead the insurance companies to observe their driving behaviour, we developed
a model to analyse the market. As we saw in previous sections, the introduction of
UBI enables the company to offer first-best contracts to low-type drivers who register
for the device. The high-types then pay a premium at least as large for the full
coverage they keep receiving, and low-types who do not register get lower coverage
for lower premium. If the market for thw low-types has not collapsed, UBI might
lead to a decrease in overall welfare as the new optimal policies imply a transfer from
high-types to the company, obtained by reducing the coverage and premium offered to
the low-types who do not register for UBI. There is a high probability that the higher
profits and the gains made by the low-types with UBI (rebate minus privacy cost) will
not compensate for these losses. Interestingly, if we begin with a situation where the
low-type market had already collapsed, in which the company was serving only the
high-types, the introduction of UBI will generate a Pareto-improvement. Like for the
3rd degree price-discrimination, if UBI allows to offer coverage to previously unserved
clients, it always increases welfare. Otherwise, it is an empirical question.
5.2 Extensions
In this paper we assumed that installing UBI would not change the behaviour of
the driver, i.e. a high risk agent would not install UBI as it would reveal her type.
However, it might be possible that high-types change their driving behaviour after
opting for UBI if the reduction in premium is substantial. In this case UBI would
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reduce the probability of incurring an accident if the type of the driver changes from
being a high-type driver to a low-type driver, increasing greatly the probability that
UBI is welfare-improving.
Another field of future study would be to have more than two types of drivers.
We could have multiple types of agents varying in their driving behaviour, and analyse
the impact of the introduction of usage-based insurance on each type of agent. Suppos-
ing we divide the population of drivers into three types: low, medium and high-types,
the effect of UBI on the low and high-types would be similar to our model. The effect
on the welfare of medium-types is however not clear, as they are in a dilemma be-
tween distinguishing themselves from the high-types or trying to mimick the low-types.
The model could also be extended such that agents with different probabilities of
accident face different amount of losses incurred in the case of an accident i.e. we
could have a probability distribution instead of discrete events. Even though this
would be more realistic, it would complicate the model but the main insights of our
model should still hold.
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